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The course of events in both the second session of the 104th Congress 
and the 1996 presidential campaign has significantly reduced the 
likelihood that a major restructuring of the federal tax system will be 
initiated in 1997. House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill 
Archer-arguably the single individual with the greatest control over 
whether and when a serious effort to overhaul the federal tax system 
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goes forward-has recently acknowledged that marking up legislation in 
1997 is no longer feasible: 
[S]uch a massive undertaking is going to have to have broad consensus and 
bipartisan support within this country. That consensus is not there yet, because 
the information is not yet there . 
. . . [U]ltimately the president needs to be convinced this is the right thing 
Clearly, we are going to have to resolve differences within the Republican 
Party before we are going to be able to complete a structural replacement of the 
income tax . . . . 1 
The delay in Congress' timetable is a welcome development for those 
who appreciate how far-reaching the impact of substituting a comprehen-
sive consumption tax for the existing federal personal and corporate 
income taxes would be on state and local tax systems and fiscal capacity. 
In no other area is the information gap that Representative Archer 
referred to more evident than with respect to the effect of major federal 
tax changes on our system of federalism. Failure to appreciate and to 
address the effects of federal tax restructuring on state and local 
governments could undermine not only one of its primary 
goals-administrative simplification-but also the current thrust of 
federal domestic policy-making generally: devolution of substantial 
service responsibility to states and localities. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE RELIANCE ON THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX "INFRASTRUCTURE" 
We have been actively writing and speaking on this subject for more 
than a year and a half. The testimony of the Multistate Tax Commission 
submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee on May 1, 1996, 
which follows this introduction, encapsulates our analysis. It emphasizes 
what seems to us to be the most superficially obvious and, at the same 
time, the least appreciated impact on state and local tax systems of 
substituting any contemplated version of a consumption tax for the 
existing federal personal and corporate income taxes: the effective repeal 
of state personal and/or corporate income taxes as well. In adopting a 
federal starting point for the calculation of these taxes-as virtually all 
of them do--states have chosen to rely on the full range of Internal 
Revenue Service activities that are required to administer both taxes in 
an effective and equitable manner. These activities include developing 
regulations to define items of taxable income and allowable deductions, 
I. John Godfrey, Archer Outlines 1997 Tax Agenda, 73 TAX NOTES, 11, 11-12 
( Oct. 7, 1996). 
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requiring their reporting to federal authorities (information that is either 
simultaneously reported to or shared with the states), auditing a 
significant sample of taxpayers (particularly under the corporate tax), 
and, if need be, pursuing disputable issues through the courts. No state 
could cost effectively preserve a traditional personal or corporate income 
tax in the absence of the federal administrative and legal infrastructure 
comprised of the IRS and the Internal Revenue Code. 
Beyond practical issues of cost lie fundamental questions of law. It 
seems highly unlikely that states would be able to compel companies, 
over which they lack personal jurisdiction, to report income they provide 
to the state's residents. Therefore, if Company A does not purposefully 
direct commercial activity to State B, State B cannot likely require 
Company A to report dividends or interest it pays to Mr. C, one of State 
B's residents. Indeed, State B cannot compel reporting of Mr. C's 
taxable wages if they are earned outside of State B. Absent mandatory 
reporting of income to the federal government, it cannot be effectively 
taxed at the state level-at least not without a level of state auditing that 
would be unacceptable for both political and fiscal reasons. 
Now, as the Commission's testimony makes clear, there are significant 
differences among the various consumption tax proposals in the degree 
to which they render infeasible the maintenance of either existing state 
personal and corporate income taxes or broad-based substitutes for them. 
For example, the Nunn-Domenici "unlimited savings allowance (USA) 
tax"2 would permit states to preserve a traditional ability-to-pay-based 
personal income tax, because income from capital would continue to be 
reported. 3 Both the USA tax and the various "flat tax" bills4 based on 
the Hall-Rabushka proposal5 would permit states to substitute a broad-
based, apportioned, "subtraction-method" value-added tax for their 
existing corporate income taxes. (In this regard, the significance of the 
2. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
3. However, see the discussion in the Multistate Tax Commission Testimony to 
the House Ways and Means Committee on the "source taxation" problem created under 
the USA tax by the heightened incentives it would provide for individuals to retire to 
states not taxing consumed income. Dan R. Bucks, Federal Tax Restructuring: Perils 
and Possibilities for the States; Testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, May 1, 1996, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1468 (1996) 
[hereinafter Bucks, MTC Testimony]. 
4. See, e.g., S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995); H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
5. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). 
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U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of 
Treasury,6 upholding the apportionability of the Michigan "single 
business tax," cannot be overstated.) On the other hand, the wholesale 
substitution of a transactional consumption tax (such as a European 
"credit-invoice" value-added tax or the national retail sales tax7) for the 
federal personal/corporate income tax structure would, in our judgment, 
leave states no choice but to repeal their corporate personal income taxes 
as well. (That is, unless Congress affirmatively chose to preserve state 
income taxation by requiring continued reporting of profits, wages, 
personal income from capital ownership, etc.) 
We remain convinced that the most significant implications for state 
and local tax systems of federal tax restructuring flow from its effects on 
the administrative and legal infrastructure that would (or would not) be 
available to states following enactment. Although this view is admitted-
ly debatable, we would urge state tax officials to continue placing 
primary emphasis on these administrative issues--if for no other reason 
than that so many federal policy-makers "inside the Beltway" seem 
incapable of recognizing them. 
The most glaring example of an inability to "see the forest for the 
trees" is provided by a Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) study, Impact 
on State and Local Governments and Tax-Exempt. Organizations of 
Replacing the Federal Income Tax,8 prepared for the hearing to which 
the Commission submitted the testimony reprinted in this Symposium.9 
After correctly noting that "[b ]ecause most of the states that collect 
individual and corporate income taxes model their state income tax 
systems after the Federal income tax system, any significant restructuring 
of the Federal income tax system could have considerable corollary 
implications for such states," the JCT simply observed that . "the 
elimination of a Federal income tax and replacement with a consump-
tion-based tax would entail a considerable increase in the complexity and 
expense of administering a state income tax system."10 While devoting 
seventeen full pages to an analysis of the implications of federal tax 
restructuring for the implicit federal subsidy afforded by the tax 
exemption for interest on state and local government debt, II the JCT 
apparently did not regard the "expense of administering a state income 
6. 498 U.S. 358 (1991). 
7. H.R. 3039, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
8. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON 
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS OF 
REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1996). 
9. Bucks, MTC Testimony, supra note 3. 
10. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8, at 70. 
11. Id. at 84-100. 
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tax system" in the absence of analogous federal taxes---let alone the 
fundamental feasibility of doing so--as an issue worthy of even a 
sentence! When it turned its attention to the complete replacement of 
the federal income tax by a national retail sales tax, the JCT seemed to 
view adapting to a new, broader sales tax base as the states' most 
significant problem.12 Readers will search the JCT report in vain for 
an analysis of whether states could maintain income taxes in the 
complete absence_ of a federal income tax and, if not, of the federal 
government's ability to administer a twenty percent retail sales tax in an 
environment in which states and localities would need to raise their 
combined sales tax rates to approximately the fifteen percent level to 
replace their personal and corporate income taxes. 
IL THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUES FOR STATES AND LOCALITIES 
The narrowing of state and local tax policy choices, relative to those 
currently available, is a thread joining all of the major proposals for 
federal tax restructuring. However, it is not the only effect on states and 
localities of enacting a federal consumption tax. Two years into the 
current discussion there is, finally, a rich literature on this topic. Rather 
than attempt to discuss or pass judgment on issues that have already 
been thoroughly analyzed by others, we will simply summarize five 
other major implications for state and local taxation and fiscal capacity 
that have been identified and refer readers to articles that focus on these 
issues: 
(1) To varying degrees, federal consumption taxes may subject state 
and local governments themselves to direct federal taxation. 13 Theoreti-
cal justifications exist for taxing state and local governments either as 
collective consumers ( e.g., of the value of goods and services to build 
roads, police cars, and even the personal services provided by their 
employees) or as producers of public services.14 The administrative 
and political infeasibility of adding a federal sales tax or VAT to state 
and local tax bills makes it inore likely that such governments would be 
charged sales tax or VAT on their purchases. Under the flat tax, state 
12. Id. at 71. 
13. The most in-depth discussion of these issues may be found in STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 10, at 49-70. 
14. Id. at 52-58. 
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and local governments would be subject to direct taxation on the value 
of fringe benefits provided to their employees. 15 Either approach 
would make it more difficult for state and local governments to achieve 
balanced budgets with existing revenue levels.16 
(2) Certain possible macroeconomic effects of federal tax restructur-
ing could have significant impacts on state and local government 
revenue-raising capacity. 17 While these effects are a matter of consid-
erable dispute among economists, they nonetheless warrant consideration 
in any thorough analysis of the implications for state and local govern~ 
ments of implementing a federal consumption tax. Three major issues 
are most commonly discussed. · 
First, some economists assert that elimination of current tax preferenc-
es for owner-occupied housing (principally the mortgage interest and 
property tax deductions) would result, at least in the short term, in a 
significant drop in home values. Because owner-occupied homes 
represent a major share of local property tax bases, this could lead to a 
reduction in local property tax revenues in the absence of offsetting tax 
rate increases. (It should be kept in mind that many local governments 
are subject to legal limitations on their authority to raise property tax 
rates.) 
Second, because the hallmark of consumption taxation is the 
elimination of taxation on the return to new investment, some econo-
mists assert that the value of existing investments could drop significant-
ly. (A fierce debate rages as to whether transition rules should be 
adopted to help preserve the relative value of the existing capital stock.) 
Just as in the case of home values, a drop in the value of existing farms, 
rental housing, and commercial and industrial real estate and equipment 
could have a significant downward impact on local property tax bases 
and tax collections. 
Third, the wholesale shift of the federal tax system from taxation of 
income to taxation of consumption could lead to a significant decrease 
in national consumer expenditures and a corresponding increase in the 
national savings rate. (Achieving this result is, of course, one of the 
15. Id. at 34. 
16. A study by the staff of the California Franchise Tax Board has estimated that 
this provision of the flat tax would cost California and its local governments $2.6 billion 
annually. Economics and Statistical Research Bureau, Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., The 
Impact of the Flat Tax on California, at 64 (1995). 
17. The most thorough discussion of these issues may be found in Gerald E. Auten 
& Eric J. Toder, Federal Consumption Tax Proposals and the States, The Sales Tax in 
the 21st Century (William F. Fox & Matthew Murray eds.) (manuscript on file with 
author); and DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, CONSUMPTION-BASED TAX REFORM AND THE 
STATE-LOCAL SECTOR 476-77 (1996). 
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principal objectives of advocates of a federal consumption tax.) Given 
the substantial reliance of state and· 1ocal governments on consumption 
taxation (sales and excise taxes account for thirty-five percent of state 
and local tax revenues and twenty-five percent of own-source reve-
nues),18 a significant nationwide drop in consumption could reduce 
state and local revenues in the absence of offsetting tax .rate increases or 
base-broadening. · 
(3) All of the major proposals for federal consumption taxes would 
eliminate the remaining ability of individuals to deduct state and local 
income and property taxes in determining their federal tax liability. (The 
USA tax and the flat tax do not permit such deductions in calculating 
their respective household-level taxes; the national retail sales tax and a 
credit-invoice VAT would, of course, eliminate household tax filing 
entirely). As was exhaustively discussed during the debate on eliminat-
ing state and local tax deductibility that occurred during development of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, eliminating deductibility increases the 
effective "tax price" of state and local. services. 19 The possibly 
attendant affects that expert observers have identified20 include: (a) 
immediate taxpayer pressures for reduction in state and local taxes and 
spending; (b) greater taxpayer resistance to tax increases that may be 
sought in the future; ( c) taxpayer resistance to state and local tax and 
spending policies that tend to redistribute income or tax burdens from 
upper income segments of the population to lower income segments 
(since upper income taxpayers are most likely to itemize state and local 
tax deductions on their federal returns and therefore experience a tax 
increase resulting from the elimination of deductibility); and ( d) 
18. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series GB/92-5, Government Finances: 1991-92, 
at 7 (1996). 
19. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT 
A-97, STRENGTHENING THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL TAXING AND BORROWING 37-66 (1984); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, 
Federal Deductibility, and the Tax Structure, 12 J. OF PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109 
(1993); Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax Deductibility 
on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. OF POL. ECON. 710 (1987). 
20. Again, we wish to emphasize that we are not attempting to evaluate the 
accuracy of these predictions or taking a position on their desirability. Many economists 
who would agree with the predictions believe the outcomes are desirable, that is, that 
federal tax policy should not shield state and.local taxpayers from the full "tax price" 
of state and local services because it leads to economically inefficient levels of demand 
for such services. See generally Metcalf, supra note 19; Feldstein & Metcalf, supra note 
19. 
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pressures to shift the burden of state and local taxes away from 
household taxes and toward business taxes ( since under most federal 
consumption tax proposals businesses may continue to deduct state and 
local taxes as ordinary business expenses). 
(4) All major proposals for a federal consumption tax either reduce 
(in the case of the USA tax) or eliminate (all others) the implicit federal 
subsidy afforded by the federal tax exemption for interest paid on state 
and local government borrowings.21 Again, the ultimate impact of 
eliminating this subsidy on the interest cost of state and local govern-
ment is a matter of debate among economists; it depends critically on the 
impact on interest rates, generally, of shifting to a federal consumption 
tax (which is itself a matter of debate). Any increase in the interest 
costs of state and local governments is significant, since collectively they 
paid $65 billion in interest in FY92, and these costs equaled eight 
percent of their own-source revenues.22 
(5) Federal adoption of a transactional consumption tax (either a 
national retail sales tax or a credit-invoice VAT) would raise a host of 
issues for existing state and local sales taxes quite apart from all of those 
previously discussed.23 In one way or another, the issues revolve 
· around competition between, and coordination of, the federal and 
state/local taxes. Some impacts on state and local sales taxation that 
have been postulated include: (a) "crowding out" of the state and local 
sales tax base by the federal tax, e.g., political pressure for immediate 
reductions in state and local sales taxes or against future increases, 
because voters have a limited tolerance for taxation of any particular 
base; (b) political pressure brought by the business community (which 
of course must collect transactional taxes) for either mandatory 
conformity of the state and local sales tax base to the federal base or 
elimination of state/local sales taxes entirely and substitution of revenue 
sharing; and ( c) a similar issue of tax base definition autonomy, and an 
additional issue of the adequacy of federal reimbursement of state costs, 
if states were either to be mandated or given the option to administer a 
21. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8, at 84-100. See also 
Hearing on the Impact on State and Local Governments and Tax-Exempt Entities of 
Replacing the Federal Income Tax Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (various written submissions of state and local government 
organizations). Again, we are not taking a position on the appropriateness of such a 
subsidy from a public policy standpoint. 
22. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
23. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 19, 
at 93-99; Charles E. McLure, Jr., State and Local Implications of a Federal Value Added 
Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 1517 (March 28, 1988); Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form ofa 
Federal Value-Added Tax: Implications for State and Local Retail Sales Taxes, 22 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 291, 311-18 (1993). 
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federal transactional tax for the federal government. Other experts have 
stressed that numerous positive benefits could flow from the states' 
administration of a federal transactional consumption tax.24 
III. CONCLUSION 
While they have received relatively little serious attention to date, we 
believe that the potential impacts on state and local government should 
be viewed by Congress as among the two or three most important issues 
it must study as it explores restructuring the federal tax system over the 
next several years. Some of the potential impacts discussed in this 
introduction, and the Commission testimony that follows, may be 
inherent in substituting a theoretically pure consumption tax for our 
current federal personal and corporate income taxes. However, Congress 
has the power to diverge from theoretical purity in pursuit of other, 
arguably legitimate, public policy goals ( e.g., to preserve tax incentives 
for owner-occupied housing, as Senator Spector proposed in his version 
of the flat tax). Congress also has the power to take other steps to 
mitigate the impact of these proposals on states and localities ( e.g., to 
maintain a structure of mandatory reporting to the federal government 
of personal income from capital ownership, so that states would have the 
option of continuing traditional income taxes even if the federal 
government itself adopted a flat tax). 
We hope that the analysis and references to other writings offered here 
will be useful to state and local officials, private practitioners, and those 
who believe that a vital state and local public sector is an essential 
element of a productive American economy. We hope that they will be 
motivated to educate members of Congress about the fundamental 
significance, for our federal system, of the decisions regarding the 
federal tax system that they may soon be making. 
24. See Ernest J. Dronenburg, SAFCT: State Administered Federal Consumption 
Tax: The Case for State Administration of a Federal Tax (Nov. 20, 1995) (paper 
prepared for the New York University Annual State and Local Taxation Conference, on , 
file with author); John A. Miller, State Administration of a National Sales Tax: A New 
Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 9 VA. TAX REV. 243 (1989). 
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APPENDIX A 
TESTIMONY TO THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 1, 1996 FEDERAL TAX 
RESTRUCTURING: PERILS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR THE STATES 
DAN R. BUCKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION 
An historic debate is developing over the nature of the federal tax 
system. Several national leaders are seeking to replace federal income 
taxes with consumption or other taxes that shift the tax burden away 
from capital income._ Each of these proposals will affect state fiscal 
systems in fundamental ways. 
The central irony of the emerging debate is that while the federal 
government is transferring expenditure responsibility to the states, most 
of the major tax changes would effectively reduce the tax policy choices 
available to states. State officials need to be engaged in this discussion 
to preserve the vitality of federalism. 
This Artiqle reviews three major variants of consumption taxes 
advocated by various Members of Congress: 
• the national retail sales tax (NRST) introduced by Representatives 
Dan Schaefer (R-CO), Billy Tauzin (D-LA) and Dick Chrysler 
(R-Ml). (This bill is House Bill 3039).1 Senator Richard Lugar 
(R-IN) has also advocated a national sales tax, although he has 
not yet introduced legislation; 
the flat tax proposed by Representative Richard Armey (R-TX) 
and Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) and a variant thereof 
introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA). · (These bills are 
House Bill 2060,2 Senate Bill 1050,3 and Senate Bill 488,4 
respectively); and 
1. H.R. 3039, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
2. H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
3. S. 1050. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
4. S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
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• the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax introduced by 
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Pete Domenici (R-NM). (This 
bill is Senate Bill 722).5 
A transactional value-added tax (VAT) is also discussed because its 
impact on states closely parallels the proposed National Retail Sales Tax. 
However, although proposals for such a VAT have been introduced in 
the 104th Congress, they are discussed only briefly because they have 
not been proposed as a substitute for the existing federal personal and 
corporate income taxes.6 Finally, a fifth proposal, by Representative 
Richard Gephardt, is not reviewed here because it does not propose 
major changes in federal taxation of business. 
Each of the plans discussed here is intended to improve the U.S. 
savings rate by shifting the burden of taxation to consumption and by 
providing direct or indirect incentives for investment and savings. 
Because each of the proposals takes a different form, they will affect 
state tax systems in different ways. Nonetheless, with respect to state 
taxation, the proposals share a common characteristic: Compared to 
current circumstances, all of the proposals would leave the states with 
fewer tax policy choices. 
The current structure of federal and state tax systems combines 
consumption taxes--state sales taxes-with ''ability to pay" tax-
es--federal, state, and local income taxes. If the federal government 
moves to a consumption tax, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
states to maintain "ability to pay" income taxes in their revenue mix. 
5. S. 722, 104th Cong., !st Sess. (1995). Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) has also 
advocated substituting the Boren-Danforth Business Activities Tax (BAT), a "subtrac-
tion-method" value-added tax, for the existing corporate income tax. · See Scrambling 
to Pay the Bills: Building Allies for America's Working Families, February 28, 1996, 
pp. 17-19. Most of the observations made here regarding the business-level tax 
embodied in the Nunn-Domenici USA plan apply with equal force to the Boren-Danforth 
BAT. The Boren-Danforth BAT was proposed in the Comprehensive Tax Restructuring 
and Simplification Act of 1994, S. 2160, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Note: 
Subsequent to the Ways and Means Committee Hearing, Representative Sam Gibbons 
(D-FL), introduced H.R. 4050, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), the "Revenue Restructuring 
Act of 1996." H.R. 4050 also proposes a subtraction-method valued-added tax, in this 
case as a substitute for federal personal and corporate income taxes and Social Security 
and Medicare taxes. 
6. See the VA Ts proposed in the Deficit and Debt Reduction and Health Care 
Financing Act of 1995 introduced as S. 237, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), by Senator 
Ernest Hollings (D-SC) and in the National Health Insurance Act introduced as H.R. 16, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), by Representative John Dingell (D-Ml). 
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Administering a state individual or corporation income tax without a 
· federal tax would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nearly all 
states. To a large degree, states currently rely on federal income tax 
definitions of income, expense, and other relevant items and begin state 
tax computations from a federal starting point. In addition, states rely 
extensively on federal audit and compliance programs for their own 
purposes and are reliant as well on federal information reporting and 
withholding rules for their own administration. Without this infrastruc-
ture, it is unlikely that states would be able to administer an income tax 
without substantial additional capacity and without additional complexity 
to taxpayers. They may also run into constitutional issues that would 
prevent effective administration, especially with respect to requiring 
information reporting by out-of-state corporations. Ultimately, these 
constitutional issues may prove to be the greatest barrier to continued 
state use of income taxes in the absence of a federal income tax. Thus, 
the proposed federal tax changes will narrow the diversity of tax policies 
available to the states, and the entire federal/state fiscal system will shift 
to various forms of consumption taxes. 
I. THE FEDERALISM lMPACTS--BRIEFLY 
Space does not allow for a full discussion of the impact of each 
proposal on our system of federalism. This high-level assessment of the 
three major plans demonstrates, however, that the impacts are significant 
and vary somewhat among them. 
(1) National Retail Sales Tax. Replacing the federal income tax with 
a single transactional tax, such as the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler NRST 
or a Euro-VAT, will also require that states shift in large part to such a 
tax. As noted above, it seems unlikely in the extreme that a state could 
effectively maintain and administer an income tax in the absence of a 
federal counterpart. Thus, a primary federalism impact of these 
transaction tax proposals is that states would no longer have the option 
of including ability-to-pay income taxes in their tax mix. 
With all income taxes repealed, a single tax base-consumption--
would be used to finance the majority of federal and state services and 
a substantial share of local services. No other major industrialized 
country relies to such a high degree on transactional consumption taxes; 
instead they typically mix consumption and ability-to-pay income taxes 
much as the states do now.7 
7. This heavy reliance is likely to lead to higher rates than some envision. The 
15% rate included in the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler NRST does not acknowledge the need 
of states to find a replacement for their income tax receipts. After accounting for the 
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The limits on policy ch~ices would be especially dramatic in the five 
states that do not now levy a state sales tax: Alaska, Delaware, 
Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Sales taxes are a divisive issue 
in these states, and indeed Montana and Oregon voters have specifically 
rejected such taxes in referenda on several occasions. Yet, under an 
NRST or a Euro-VAT, these states would likely have to abandon their 
traditional reliance, qn income taxes. The impact on · these states 
highlights in the extreme the constraints placed on the policy choices of 
all states under a shift to a federal transactional consumption tax. 
An NRST or a Euro-VAT would also raise the key federalism issue 
of the autonomy allowed states to define the bases (and perhaps rates) 
of state sales taxes or VATs. Admirably, the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler 
NRST leaves states free to retain their own sales taxes and opt-out of 
administering the federal tax: Whether such a dual system would be 
politically sustainable in the long run is open to question, however. It 
seems likely that the American business community would apply intense 
pressure for mandatory consolidation, and it is true that a consolidated 
federal-state tax would be easier to administer for taxpayers and tax 
administrators alike. · 
However, consolidation of the two levels of taxation would mean that 
Congress would control the structure of state retail sales taxes. And, 
given that these proposals may compel states to abandon income taxes, 
the result is congressional control of the major share of the general fund 
revenues of most states. This control could even theoretically lead over 
time to congressional earmarking or restraining of the uses of state 
revenues. If the NRST or Euro-VAT leads to states losing the authority 
to determine tax policy for themselves, the balance of power in our 
federal system will shift profoundly in favor of the national government. 
Others may argue that the loss · of autonomy in tax policy will be 
outweighed by the efficiency benefits to the national economy arising 
from a common national tax. Proponents could also argue that states 
will enjoy the revenue benefits of Congress enacting a tax base that is 
broader than most states have been able to adopt on their own. Whether 
need to replace state income taxes, plus the likelihood that the final tax base will be 
narrower than the pure consumption base used to calculate the 15% rate, the final 
combined federal-state-local tax rate necessary to raise revenues equal to federal and 
state income taxes, plus current state and·local sales taxes, would be in the 30% to 40% 
range. Similarly, the rate for a Euro-VAT would likely be much higher than its 
advocates anticipate. · 
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the federal base would remain immune over time to the · inevitable 
process · of exemptions and special exceptions is yet to be seen, 
however.8 
There is also no assurance that Congress, after gaining control of the 
federal and state tax base, will retain the benefits of national uniformity. 
Indeed, Congress has prohibited states from taxing certain "govemment-
sponsored enterprises," such as "Fannie-Mae," while continuing to 
subject such enterprises to federal income taxation. 
The stakes in this debate between economic efficiency and political 
autonomy are very high for the states. The authority to determine tax 
policy is a core element of sovereignty. With that power comes the 
independence to set expenditure priorities. Ultimately, the combination 
of the repeal of federal income taxes and mandated conformity to a 
federal transactional tax would make states much more dependent on the 
federal government. 
Space does not permit a discussion of all the important issues raised 
for states in the context of a National Retail Sales Tax. The proposal for 
states to administer the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler National Retail Sales 
Tax deserves serious consideration.9 State administration likely ensures 
greater attention to details important to states as well as to issues of 
national importance. State administration might also provide a means of 
resolving the use tax nexus issue; interstate sales would be taxed under 
a national sales tax, and it would make little sense to have the states 
administer a federal tax on such sales while remaining effectively 
powerless to tax them themselves. 
(2) Nunn-Domenici USA Plan. The tax plan proposed by Senators 
Nunn and Domenici combines a "federalism friendly" operational 
(Michigan-style) VAT with a consumed income tax that has the potential 
to divide the states. 
At the business tax level, Nunn-Domenici propose a subtraction-
method VAT that would be administered like an income tax. Such a tax 
8. Moreover, it is not certain that a federal NRST base that will (presumably) 
include most household purchases of services will necessarily be appreciably larger than 
existing state sales tax bases. States currently tax significant amounts of business inputs, 
which will be exempted under a national sales tax because taxing them at rates as high 
as 15-20% would lead to significant economic distortions. The expansion of the state 
sales tax base to include household services may not do much more than compensate 
states for the loss of the sales. tax base comprised of such business inputs. 
9. A member of the California State Board of Equalization (the agency charged 
with responsibility for administering that state'.s sales tax) has set forth a detailed 
proposal for state administration of a national sales tax. See Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr., 
"SAFCT: State Administered Federal Consumption Tax: The Case for State Administra-
tion of a Federal Tax," paper prepared for the New York University Annual State and 
Local Taxation Conference, November 30, 1995. 
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is "federalism-friendly" because states could readily "piggyback" on 
what would be a robust, broad-based tax. States could simply transport 
their current apportionment formulas from the corporate income tax 
arena to the new operational VAT. Michigan's experience---especially 
with the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of apportioning an operational 
VAT in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury10-serves as a 
model for other states. New Hampshire as well now has several years 
of experience with administering an operational VAT. 
The Nunn-Domenici operational VAT would also benefit states by 
reducing problems created under the corporate income tax by the 
artificial shifting of income overseas via transfer pricing. The Nunn-
Domenici plan alleviates the transfer pricing problem because export 
sales are exempt from the tax and import purchases are taxed. (In 
technical terms, it is a "border-adjusted" VAT.) 
While the business tax portion of the Nunn-Domenici plan is workable 
from a federalism perspective, the individual consumed income tax may 
be a different matter. 11 The "source tax" issue that arose in conjunction 
with pensions, IRAs and other tax-deferred retirement income would be 
magnified under the USA plan. 12 A person could add to savings and 
receive a deduction while a resident of a consumed income tax state, but 
then retire to a low-rate or non-income tax state. 13 The incentive to 
retire to such a state would greatly increase relative to the current 
situation because the exemption ( or low rate) would apply not only to 
pension benefits but to all savings vehicles. 
States could de-couple from the USA savings deduction without 
creating severe administrative complications. However, there would 
likely be significant political difficulties in eliminating at the state level 
a federal tax deduction that would be popular with individuals who have 
significant savings. 
10. 498 U.S. 358 (1991). 
11. Under the proposal, the individual tax base would be equal to income from 
wages, interest, capital gains, and dividends, less net additions to savings. 
12. Congress recently preempted the authority of states to tax, under the source 
principle, IRS-qualified pension and certain other deferred compensation benefits paid 
to former residents. See Act of January 6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979 
(1996). 
13. The issue will be exacerbated to the degree that individuals are able to borrow 
funds, up to certain limits under the USA plan, to increase their savings deduction. 
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A federalism advantage of the USA plan is that it does not interfere 
with the operation of state sales taxes. A federalism disadvantage is that 
states may find it difficult to retain a traditional "ability-to-pay" income 
tax. However, that difficulty appears to be more political than technical 
or administrative, since interest, dividend, and capital gain income would 
continue to be reported to and audited by the federal government. · 
(3) Armey-Shelby and Specter Flat Taxes. These plans aim at the 
goal of corporate tax integration, whereby all income is theoretically 
taxed only once. There is no taxation of consumed wage income twice 
as there is under the USA plan, 14 and there is no taxation of corporate 
business profits twice as is commonly alleged in the current system. 
Business profits and employee fringe benefits (except pensions) are taxed 
at the business entity level. Wages, salaries, and pension benefits are 
taxed at the individual level. Senator Specter's plan would allow for the 
deduction of home mortgage interest and charitable contributions; the 
Armey/Shelby flat tax would not. 
States could readily piggyback on the business operational VAT 
contained in both these flat tax plans, just as they could in the USA 
plan. Unlike the USA plan, however, transfer pricing remains a problem 
because the Armey/Shelby and Specter flat taxes do not qualify as 
"border adjustable" taxes. Hence, export sales are taxable, and import 
purchases are deductible as business inputs. Therefore, the same 
incentives to under-price exports to related foreign parties and to 
overprice imports from related foreign suppliers exist as under the 
current corporate income tax. Moreover, without the "backstop" of 
taxation of repatriated dividends, income once shifted overseas by U.S. 
multinational corporations is removed from the U.S. tax base forever. 
Allowing global enterprises to shift income through transfer pricing is 
a major federal policy failure, and under these flat tax proposals it 
becomes even more important to solve this problem. On the other hand, 
the reduction of tax rates under the flat tax relative to the current 
corporate income tax may decrease the incentive for artificial income 
shifting somewhat. 
The individual tax proposed in the Armey/Shelby and Specter flat tax 
proposals is designed in a manner that would make it difficult to 
impossible for states to retain a traditional individual income tax, which 
includes interest, d1vidends, and capital gains in the base. The adminis-
trative infrastructure for the taxation of these types of income would no 
14. Consumed wages are taxed at the individual level under the USA tax, and, 
because they are not deductible from the business tax base, they are effectively taxed at 
that level as well. 
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longer exist because of the elimination of the information reporting on 
these items. States that prefer a traditional income tax as a part of their 
fiscal mix would effectively no longer have that choice.15 On the other 
hand, as with the USA plan, a federalism benefit of the flat tax plans is 
that states could retain their sales taxes without inherent federal 
interference. 
II. POSSIBILITIES 
While major change in the federal tax system will present challenges 
to states and localities, it may also produce an opportunity to improve 
the operation of tax systems at all levels of government. Such improve-
ments would likely require coordination and cooperation between 
federal, state, and local governments. State officials should be full 
partners with federal officials in exploring such potential improvements. 
Interstate compacts between Congress and participating states should 
be explored as the mechanism most consistent with federalism for 
mitigating potential adverse impacts on the states from federal tax 
changes and for maximizing the benefits of coordination among federal, 
state, and local taxes. 16 Interstate compacts, freely entered into by 
states, could forestall congressional imposition of tax policy on the 
states. At the same time, interstate compacts provide a means of 
voluntarily harmonizing otherwise separate and potentially disparate tax 
policies. Compacts are especially called for if the federal government 
15. This narrowing of tax policy choices for the states might be potentially 
mitigated were Congress to empower states with the ability to require income 
information reporting by out-of-state companies or to continue to collect the information 
and share it with states on a cost-reimbursement basis. States, in tum, could cooperate 
through an interstate compact that would provide a basic, uniform legal structure for 
state income taxes. Such an approach would be consistent with federalism and would 
avoid forcing all the states into a "one size fits all" tax system controlled only by 
Congress. Beyond supporting principles of federalism, the federal interest in preserving 
a state option for income taxation ( even if not used at the federal level) would be to 
prevent the rate of federal consumption taxes from being so high that they produce their 
own forms of economic distortion and incentives for evasion. 
16. A resolution adopted by the Multistate Tax Commission at its 1995 annual 
meeting commits the Commission to "study[ing] and consider[ing] carefully the potential 
for state administration of coordinated national taxes, including the use of an interstate 
compact as a legal vehicle, consistent with preserving state authority within the federal 
system, for establishing a coordinated system of national taxation within States 
participating in the compact." 
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were to enter the field of transactional consumption taxation long relied 
upon by state governments as a major source of revenue. 
States cannot afford to ignore the debate over the shape of the nation's 
tax system. All of the major proposals for federal change will constrain 
the tax choices available to the states to some degree. It is ironic that 
as states are being assigned more expenditure responsibilities, they may 
be left with fewer revenue choices. The choice that states can make now 
is to try to influence the decisions of Congress that will vitally affect 
their future tax authority and revenue systems. 
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MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION RESOLUTION 
IMPACTS ON STATE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPOSALS FOR MAJOR 
FEDERAL TAX CHANGES 
WHEREAS, a number of announced candidates for President in the 
1996 election and members of the congressional leadership in both 
parties have recently set forth detailed proposals or otherwise called for 
major changes in fundamental federal tax policies, and 
WHEREAS, several of these proposals call for enactment at the 
federal level of a comprehensive transactional tax on consumption, 
which has heretofore been almost exclusively a major source of revenue 
for States and local governments, and 
WHEREAS, enactment of such a tax would raise significant issues of 
coordination with existing state and local sales taxes, would likely lead 
to pressure to conform state and local sales taxes to the federal base, and 
could constrain the ability of state and local governments to retain the 
existing level of reliance on sales taxes or to achieve increases in sales 
taxes that might be judged necessary in the future, and 
WHEREAS, at least one announced proposal for a comprehensive 
federal consumption tax contemplates its administration by the States on 
behalf of the federal government, and 
WHEREAS, some proposals for enactment of a comprehensive 
transactional tax on consumption contemplate such a tax as a complete 
substitute for federal corporate and personal income taxes, and 
WHEREAS, elimination of the federal corporate and personal income 
taxes would eliminate federal income tax legal frameworks, definitions, 
income information reporting, tax withholding and tax auditing upon 
which States depend critically for cost-effective enforcement of their 
own taxes and thereby raise critical issues concerning the cost and 
feasibility of instituting these requirements and activities at the state 
level, and 
WHEREAS, other proposals for comprehensive reform of the federal 
personal income tax base, the substitution of a consumed-income tax for 
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the personal income tax and the substitution of a business activities tax 
for the federal corporate income tax would, given widespread, conformi-
ty to federal tax bases, similarly lead to major transitional adjustments 
in state tax policy and administration, and 
WHEREAS, some proposals for overhaul of the personal income tax 
raise issues unique to States, such as a potentially greater share of the 
consumed-income tax base becoming subject, not to deferred taxation at 
the time of consumption, but rather permanent exemption if consumed 
in a non-taxing State, and · 
WHEREAS, in sum, all of the major extant proposals for comprehen-
sive federal tax reform have major implications for the ability of States 
to retain their current tax policies and systems of tax administration, and 
WHEREAS, the proponents of these proposals have given virtually 
no indication that they are aware of their potential implications for 
States, and 
WHEREAS, interstate compacts represent a partnership approach 
between Congress and the States that could be the means for coordinat-
ing overlapping federal and state taxes that is the most consistent with 
the balance of power within our federal system of government 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax 
Commission respectfully calls upon the Congress of the United States to 
consider fully the potential impact on state tax policy prerogatives and 
state tax administration of all proposals for comprehensive tax reform 
that it may consider, to consult fully regarding these impacts with 
all relevant organizations of state officials, including the Multistate Tax 
Commission, prior to the mark-up of any such legislation, and to devote 
at least one hearing on any such piece of legislation to its potential 
impact on state taxation, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the staff of the Multistate Tax 
Commission will analyze all of the major proposals for comprehensive 
reform of the federal tax system that are offered during the next several 
years and advise the Member States with regard to their impact on the 
ability and cost to the States of retaining their current systems of 
taxation, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission 
will seek to coordinate and serve as a clearinghouse for research by 
Member State revenue agencies on the impacts of the various tax 
overhaul proposals, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission 
will work diligently to bring before the U.S. Congress and other state 
government organizations all information available to it concerning the 
impact of federal tax overhaul proposals on state taxation and to ensure 
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that Congress considers these impacts in its consideration of these 
proposals, and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission 
shall study and consider carefully the potential for state administration 
of coordinated national taxes, including the use of an interstate compact 
as a legal vehicle, consistent with preserving state authority within the 
federal system, for establishing a coordinated system of national taxation 
within States participating in the compact. 
Adopted this 28th day of July, 1995, by the Multistate Tax Commis-
sion. 
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